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In this paper, an institutional perspective is used to examine the different kinds of pressures on 
entrepreneurs manifest in a conflict environment.  The study investigates how they respond to 
the conflict and establish legitimacy for their entrepreneurship in the challenging context of the 
north western areas of Pakistan. 
Design/methodology/approach 
In this study, a qualitative approach is taken based on semi-structured interviews from 16 
different firms in the SWAT valley. 
Findings 
The entrepreneurs undertake different strategies towards dealing with conflict and establishing 
legitimacy. These strategies are identified and examined in relation to the interactions between  
entrepreneurial behaviour  and institutional pressures. 
Research limitations/implications 
Qualitative research on a small sample inevitably presents a limitation on the generalisability 
of this work. Further research could employ quantitative methods to address this issue. One 
particular location is studied, so future research could be carried out in other countries or 
regions with similar problems. 
Practical implications 
The study may have value for policy makers who need to know more about how to support 
ongoing businesses in conflictual regions.  
Social implications 
Better understanding of the needs of small business may in time contribute to a better business 
climate in conflictual regions. 
Originality/value 
A new dimension is added to institutional theory through its application in the very uncertain 
environment between all out war and ongoing violence, identifying the possibility of weak 
agency for institutional change.  Further, the study contributes to the growing body of literature 
on entrepreneurship in conflict environments.   
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In this paper, an institutional perspective is applied to the thorny problem of entrepreneurship 
in regions subject to ongoing conflict, specifically, the Swat valley in the north western areas 
of Pakistan.  In doing so, the importance of context on entrepreneurship, which has received 
significant attention in recent literature (Bjornskov and Foss, 2013; Welter, 2011; Zahra et al., 
2014) is acknowledged.  Despite the challenges of conflict, some small and medium sized 
businesses and enterprises (SMEs)in the region do persist over time, with a degree of success. 
The question is,how are these firm owners orienting their entrepreneurial behaviour to deal 
with thechallenging institutional landscape that shapes their context?This studyis based on a 
qualitative studyof 16 firms, that have persisted over time, to develop an understanding of the 
relationship between entrepreneurship, institutions and context in conflictual circumstances 
(Welter and Smallbone, 2011; Welter and Smallbone, 2012). 
This is an important question, because entrepreneurship and SMEs are seen as vital in 
developing and emerging economies, due to their potential to support economic growth and 
productivity, as well as social improvement (Leff, 1978; Puffer et al., 2010).  This is so in 
Pakistan, where they provide the bulk of employment and contribute over 35% of GDP 
(Chemin, 2010).  Yet while they produce a quarter of manufacturing exports, most SMEsin 
Pakistanproduce low value-added products that rely on traditional technologies.  In addition, 
entry rates for new businesses are low, which Chemin (2010) attributes to a challenging 
economic and sociocultural environment for entrepreneurship.  It can be difficult to ‘do 
business’, particularly as a formal, registered business (Williams and Shahid, 2014), which can 
impede entrepreneurship (Williams and Vorley, 2014).Although there is potential for 
development, and indeed many success stories, the limitations of this low base are exacerbated 
in regions where conflictual circumstances pertain, such as in Khyber Pakhtunkwha(KPK) and 
surrounding regions in the north west of Pakistan and the border regions with Afghanistan.  
The relatively recent 9/11 attacks and the subsequent follow-up actions have created a new 
conflictual environment with the two countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan as the epicentre, 
particularly in KPK and the surrounding areas of Pakistan. These two countries are 
continuously under threat due to extreme conflict activities (Chen et al., 2007).  The conflict 
ranges from outright war-like strikes on villages, and core infrastructure elements such as 
roads, bridges and communications, to more subtle and persistent effects related to ongoing 
terrorism.This has manifested itself in bomb attacks on markets, places of worship, and schools 
in the Swat region, which has had a detrimental effect on economic growth (Shahbazet al., 
2013).  As Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) point out, terrorism has the potential to curb 
economic growth through a number of channels, particularly through diverting funds away 
from growth-promoting activities, towards repairs and counter-terrorist measures.  In addition, 
the fear and uncertainty generated by terrorism can reduce investment, particularly from 
overseas, as potential investors seek less violence-prone countries (Abadie and Gardeazabal 
2008, Enders and Sandler 1996, 2006).  Terrorist attacks also increase the cost of doing 
business through repairs, expensive insurance and lost business due to closure, as well as 
directly affecting sectors such as tourism (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). 
Brucket al. (2015) argue that entrepreneurs are impacted by conflictual situations in different 
ways and to different extents due to the nature and extent of the conflict in question.  Bulloughet 
al. (2014) show the importance of resilience and self-belief for entrepreneurs persisting through 
conflictual situations.  Ciarliet al. (2015) note that entrepreneurial activity can actually increase 
in times of conflict, but the quality of outcome can be diminished, in that the growth–focussed 
activities practiced in peacetime can be replaced with survival activities that provide little 
return or prospect of future development. Generally, conflicts can deplete the capital stock of 
a country and its firms; they can also deplete the human capital, impacting on how individuals 
or communities perceive potentially profitable opportunities and create new value from these 
opportunities.   
Brucket al. (2015) argue that thus far, the majority of research on entrepreneurship has dealt 
with economic growth and development in relatively stable contexts, including where conflict 
has ended and restructuring is underway, such as in the transitional economies of Eastern 
Europe.  Situations where countries or regions get mired down in economic decline and 
ongoing conflict tend to be neglected.  Roberts (2010) also notes that little research has been 
done in this domain.  Most studies thus far have highlighted the impact of conflict around issues 
concerning security and reconstruction at the macro level, and also with the role of the state 
agency (see Collier, 1999; Cramer, 2006).  There has been less interest thus far in the 
microeconomic impact of conflict and the extent to which it deters or defines entrepreneurial 
activities (Ciarliet al., 2010). Some studies have begun to reveal the direct and indirect impact 
of a conflict environment on entrepreneurial activity, particularly in Afghanistan (Binzel and 
Tilman, 2007; Bulloughet al., 2014; Justino, 2009). If conflict affects a business in a one-off, 
shock-like manner, the loss of employees (they may have fled or may have been killed) may 
well destroy a business in the short term. Later on though, activities may be resumed, and a 
resilient business may return to stability, of a kind (Brucket al., 2011). In contrast, despite the 
recognised tenacity of entrepreneurship in conflictual situations (Bulloughet al., 2014; Ciarliet 
al., 2010) continuous, unremitting conflict may have a destructive impact on firm-level 
investment and growth over the long term, which may result in a growing number of business 
failures and economic decline over time (Brucket al., 2011).  While many agencies work 
towards a more peaceful climate for business in conflictual regions, there is no knowing if or 
when that will prevail, and it is therefore important to understand how successful SMEssucceed 
in the short term. Despite all thecontextual difficultieswhich impact on the likelihood of 
entrepreneurial success (Dollinger, 2003), many SMEs manage to not only survive, but thrive. 
Further research is needed to effectively understand the needs of entrepreneurs and SME 
owners in the region, as they struggle to succeed, yet are so important in the social fabric of the 
region as it strives towards a more stable future. Better understanding of the difficulties they 
face at the micro-level may aid the appropriate targeting of support programmes. 
Thus, in this paper, the interplay between the conflictualcontext and the entrepreneurial 
behaviours of theowner-managersof 16 small firms in a particular area, the Swat valley is 
investigated. Welter and Smallbone (2012) recognise that entrepreneurship is influenced by 
external conditions and situations, which can impact on personal circumstances, and also on 
how entrepreneurs behavein regard to opportunity recognition and development, and business 
strategy.  This is important because the classic vocabulary around concepts used to explain 
entrepreneurship, such as the need to achieve success, motivation and fulfilment for example, 
must be interpreted in the context in which they are used.  Following on from that,the outcomes 
of such research must be grounded in that context.To that end, institutional theory is a valuable 
theoretical frame for underpinning new empirical studies.  In enabling us to connect the agency 
of entrepreneurship with the interplay between formal and informal institutions (Hashiet al., 
2011; Maguire and Hardy, 2006; Welter and Smallbone, 2011; Williams and Shahid, 2014; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014), institutional theory enables us to explain entrepreneurial 
behaviour patterns in the challenging conflictual context, as the entrepreneurs seek to operate 
legitimately in the uncertainties in which they find themselves.Lounsbury and Glynn (2001) 
and  Martens et al., (2007) articulate the importance of research into legitimacy, particularly 
that which focuses on how entrepreneurs gain legitimacy byarticulating stories (micro level) 
about themselves with appropriate institutional beliefs (macro-level). 
 
The contribution of this research istwofold. First, the article provides difficult to access 
empirical evidence on entrepreneurial behaviour in a conflict environment, thus adding to the 
work of Brucket al. (2015), Bulloughet al., (2014) and Ciarliet al., (2010) and Roberts, 2010). 
The second contribution is to the theory on institutional understandings of entrepreneurship in 
context, extending the existing literature to include conflict (rather than occupation, or 
economic turbulence) as a context (Welter and Smallbone, 2011; Williams and Shahid, 2014; 
Williams and Vorley, 2014). In doing so, the ‘green shoots’ of weak agency for institutional 
change are identified.  The paper proceeds with the research context, then a review of the 
literature, methodology and findings. A discussion follows, the implications of this research 
are considered and conclusions drawn. 
 
Research Context 
Research concerning conflictual environments and entrepreneurial activity has only recently 
become a focus for academic scholars and the relationship between the two is not well 
understood (Boudreaux, 2007; Brucket al., 2011; Bulloughet al, 2014; Brucket al., 2015; 
Ciarliet al., 2010).  At a very basic level, continuous conflict can result in the cessation of 
entrepreneurial activity altogether, or at best the continuance of basic survival level ‘necessity’ 
entrepreneurship.  Of course, in those areas where severe conflict activities continually deter 
the growth of businesses,there is little research, due to limited access for security reasons 
(Roberts, 2010).  Where the conflict is less severe, businesses may persist and thrive, though 
in constrained circumstances, as is the case in this study. 
 
Institutional theorists tend to distinguish between formal institutions, such as constitutional 
government and military forces, and informal institutions, which refer to patterns of 
relationships around culture and values.  Both formal and informal institutions can be weak or 
strong, but it is unwise to assume that there is necessarily a clear definition between the two 
(Bratton, 2007). In Pakistan, on the formal side, there is an elected constitutional government, 
a well-trained army, plus education provision and the rule of law.  The formal institutions tend 
to work well in developed urban areas, but less so, the further one gets into the regions. Some 
of these remain quite undeveloped and tribal agencies or networks are influential in 
governance, embedding their own customs and values(Nouman, 2011).  The Swat valley falls 
into this category; it is in the province of KPK, a hundred miles from the capital of Pakistan, 
Islamabad.  Another powerful force in the regions is the ‘Pakistani Taliban (Tehrik-i-Taliban)i 
political movement, which can compete for representation through the formal democratic 
system, but has been responsible for insurgency too. The Taliban espouses a hard line version 
of Islam, which favours the imposition of Islamic Sharia law over the current legal system in 
Pakistan.The latter was initially based on British Law in India, and more lately, the US Federal 
system, albeit with some nuances influenced by Islam.  The calls for Sharia law have impacted 
not only at regional level in Swat, but also for national implementation tooii.  This intermingling 
of politics, comprising formal processes and offices, with religioncomplicates the picture; as a 
set of cultural values, religion is informal, but it can manifest as formal or quasi-formal too.  A 
further institutional complexity relates to questions over whether Pakistan’s armed forces and 
intelligence operations are as separate from the Taliban as they have claimed to be since 9/11. 
 
The conflict referred to in this studyresulted froman initial Taliban insurgency in the Swat 
valley in 2008, and ongoingmilitary responses to it bynational government troops.Prior to the 
Taliban attacks, Swat was a major tourist area in the region, with some strong national 
institutions, such as formal education; for example, Swat boasted a comparatively good record 
within KPK for literacy and education for girls.  Government troops were initially defeated by 
the Taliban, who took control of local administration, police and schools and then imposed a 
strict version of Sharia law.  Girls’ schools were closed down and women could no longer 
participate in society as they had before. Many businesses were closed down too, due to 
uncertainty in the region, and some were annexed by the Taliban (Rashid, 2009).  This was a 
difficult era for everyone, not just business, as many people were killed outright, and many 
‘old scores’ were settled. In 2009, six million people were displaced from Swat, becoming 
Internally Displaced People. Since then, sporadic terrorist activities have continued around 
clashes in culture, norms and values; military action by the Pakistan army to remove the Taliban 
continues to this day.  While many businesses and organisations continue to operate in the 
region, institutional changes of this magnitude clearly create a difficult context for businesses, 
impacting on every aspect of business operation; in addition the ongoinguncertainty presents a 
strategic challenge.  Although the situation at present is relatively stable, business owners have 
to act and make decisions for the long and medium term, not knowing how long the situation 
will continue, or what the eventual outcome of the tensions might be.  This context thus presents 
a unique context for examining entrepreneurship in a conflictual institutional environment. 
 
Literature review 
Welter (2011) argues that the context in which entrepreneurship occurs impacts upon attitudes 
and motives, and the resources that can be mobilized as well as the constraints and opportunities 
on/for starting and running a business (Doern, 2014; Martinelli 2004).  As a consequence, the 
context has an impact on the nature, pace of development, and extent of entrepreneurship as 
well as the way entrepreneurs behave (Zahra et al., 2014). It has been argued by several authors 
that institutional theory provides a useful framework for enhancing understanding of the 
relationship between the entrepreneur and their context (Brutonet al.,2010; Jennings et al., 
2013; Lang et al., 2014; Thornton et al., 2011).  Hoskissonet al., (2000) argue that institutional 
theory emphasises the different externalpolitical, economic and societal influences on 
individual behaviour, thus acknowledging different levels of institutions. Kloostermanet 
al.(1999) andKloosterman(2010) too, suggest a multi-layeredanalysis based on the concept of 
mixed embeddedness, which recognises the diverseinstitutional layers at macro and micro 
level, in which human agency is embedded. A society’s institutional environment is viewed as 
having a strong influence on entrepreneurial activity (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Spedale 
and Watson (2014) remind us that the individual cannot be separated from their context and 
that entrepreneurial action emerges at the intersection between society and the individual.  
Thus, as socially embedded actors, individuals facing situations and problems call upon 
habitual schemas and previously successful routines to orient their behaviour.  However, habit 
has to be flexible when faced with the presence of multiple and competing institutional logics 
(Spedale and Watson, 2014; Thornton, 2004) which may present competing claims and 
necessitate diverse courses of action, as actors seek to segregate or distinguish themselves from 
others (Lounsbury, 2008).Lounsbury and Glynn (2001), Martens et al., (2007) and Navis and 
Glynn (2011) all emphasise the importance of entrepreneurial behaviour being perceived in 
society as legitimate in relation to the institutional climate in which they operate.  Warren and 
Smith (2015) remind us that there may be adverse outcomes if entrepreneurs fail to navigate 
by the rules of the day. Yet the tensions of achieving legitimacy can be very challenging in 
Pakistan, where it is widely recognizedthat informal institutions relating to commonly held 
norms, values and beliefs may differ from formal laws and regulations, resulting inwhat formal 
institutions deem to be illegal activities (round taxation for example) being construed as 
legitimate in the community (FBR 2008). 
 
Other authors have noted that entrepreneurs react in different ways to challenging institutional 
environments that are hostile, but fall short of war.  Such environments can present uncertain 
and turbulent institutional frameworks, such as during the restructuring of post-Soviet bloc 
economies.  Here, entrepreneurs may react by evading the rules and formulating other 
solutions, usually via informal pathways which are nonetheless accepted as legitimate in the 
community (Kalantaridis, 2007;Mair, et al., 2012; Sutter et al., 2013; Welter and Smallbone, 
2011; Williams and Shahid, 2014; Williams and Vorley, 2014).  Alternatively, if entrepreneurs 
lack legitimacy in a community, they can be motivated to actively assist prevalent institutions, 
in order to preserve their businesses in the face of any ensuing hostility(Lang et al., 2014; 
Welter, 2011).  Again, as in more extreme conflictual situations, institutional voids of various 
kinds may foster negative forms of entrepreneurial behaviour, if the prevalent institutions are 
dysfunctional or corrupt, but only as far as the informal institutions of society allow, in terms 
of legitimacy.  As Baumol (1990:987) notes, conflict can tilt incentives in a society for talented 
entrepreneurs to engage in counterproductive illegitimate activities that can lead to an 
underdevelopment trap, if violent conflict becomes significant and persists. Mehlumet al. 
(2003) too, show how a poor country can become trapped in low development as a result of the 
misallocation of entrepreneurial talent towards what they term ‘predation’. In their model, an 
entrepreneur must make a choice between becoming a ‘predator’ or ‘prey’ (i.e. a producer).  In 
very dysfunctional settings, entrepreneurship may be expressed negatively, for example 
profiteering, or inflammatory behaviour that is fuelled by, and also contributes to conflict rather 
than seeking to create more constructive value elsewhere (Abdukadirov, 2010; Baumol, 1990; 
Brucket al., 2011; Canares, 2011; Naude, 2007).  A few studies have examined this negative 
side of entrepreneurship in conflictual regions (Addison, 2001; Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2006; 
Cooper, 2006; McDougal, 2010). Generally, these studies have been located in ’frontline’ war 
situations, and refer to such situations as trading with troops on active service.  Welter and 
Smallbone (2011)point out that entrepreneurs must also look to what happens when the war or 
conflict ends in terms of their ongoing need for legitimacy.  Of course, not all entrepreneurs 
react in the same way to institutional pressures, but are influenced by complex interactions of 
many factors (Peng, 2000; Sutter et al., 2013; Welter and Smallbone, 2011).   
 
From an institutional perspective, the intermingling of formal and informal institutions in 
Pakistan, aligned with the potential for sudden disruptive change presents a high degree of 
uncertainty for entrepreneurs.  The uncertaintybrings questions over how entrepreneurs should 
develop and present their businesses in terms of legitimacy (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2004) 
where what is legitimate today, may not be legitimate tomorrow, if there is a sudden 
institutional shift.  This circumstance brings with it the need for ‘institutional work’ (Suddaby 
and Greenwood, 2005), whichJennings et al., (2013)see for entrepreneurship as a set of 
complex, entwined social processes where actors take on multiple roles and respond 
strategically and reflexively at the micro level.  To do so, they use methods such as bricolage 
(Baker and Nelson, 2005), managed narratives (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005), local 
negotiation (Maguire and Hardy, 2006) or practice development (Jarzabkowski, 2005).  
Maguire and Hardy (2009) introduce the concept of ‘defensive institutional work’, which may 
be necessary when outsider-driven de-institutionalisation takes place, referring, in their case, 
to an environmental shift.  Inherent in these studies is the notion of agency, where entrepreneurs 
not only react to institutional pressures, but through their actions, may themselves reshape, or 
attempt to reshape, prevailing institutions. 
 
The situation occurring in Swat, seems to fall between two areas of study – not all out war, but 
more than economic upheaval caused by restructuring;  rather, an ongoing conflictual situation 
with intense clashes of cultural values and societal norms that result in sporadic violence, that 
could continue indefinitely, or be ended by another period of war and displacement for 
civilians.Sutter et al. (2013) refer to an intermediate situation where semi-formal illegitimate 
institutional arrangements pertain but are enforced by coercion, referring to gang dominance 
in Guatemala.  Here, illegitimate actors create rules for economic activity, exercise power 
through coercive means, and even extract ‘taxes’.  Consistent with Oliver (1991), entrepreneurs 
acted to defy, avoid or acquiesce to the situation in which they found themselves.  Defiance 
involved the protection of physical space; avoidance involved changes in business model or 
moving the business to avoid exposure to illegitimate actors;acquiescence referred to 
complying with demands, or in some cases terminating the business.  Sutter et al. (2013) argue 
that defiance and avoidance incur cost and risk, but offer more legitimacy in the wider 
community than acquiescence, which may aid their survival long-term if the conflictual 
circumstance ends (Welter and Smallbone, 2011).  Their study links strategies of defiance and 
avoidance with strong networks, where entrepreneurs can leverage these ties to a form of 
collective resistance, demonstrating a purposeful effort to change the situation (Seo and Creed, 
2002) and a more agential view of institutional theory (Welter and Smallbone, 2011). 
 
Sutter et al. (2013) note that groups like the Taliban create institutional arrangements that are 
not accepted by many in the population, but are nonetheless formalised to a degree.  That 
assertion seems reasonable, though these authors also point out as a limitation of their study 
that there is likely to be significant variation in different settings. It could be argued that the 
Swat valley circumstance is different to those in regions afflicted by gangs or organised crime. 
This is because in Swat, the aggressors are attempting to re-embedinto relatively sound formal 
institutions, religious and cultural norms that have had held significance historically for the 
population as a whole for generations, and may still be desirable for at least some of the 
population, to differing extents.  The distinction of what is legitimate behaviour is thus less 
clear cut; additionally, there is the hope that, given the involvement of the armed forces, and 
government, that the situation will end soon, and that the prior institutional situation can and 
will be rapidly reconstituted.Of course, ongoing uncertainty remains. 
 
As in almost all countries, the formal legal and financial frame governs venture development 
through laws of contract, taxation and bankruptcy, and that remains in place in Swat, but 
Williams and Shahid (2014) remind us that many organisations are unregistered in Pakistanand 
even those that are registered may nonetheless have significant areas of informal operation.  
Typically this is to avoid taxation and government interference of various kinds.  Such 
institutional gaps of course, allow for arbitrary actions on the part of both business owners and 
officials, which can lead to entrepreneurial opportunities for those who spot new possibilities, 
particularly in fast-changing environments (Welter and Smallbone, 2011).  Of course that may 
not necessarily benefit the wider community, and indeed such opportunities may be transient, 
which might present a challenge to legitimacy long-term. Generally, as Chemin (2010) notes, 
thismodus operandi has led to a challenging climate for SMEs and entrepreneurs generally in 
Pakistan, and this would likely still pertain for businesses in Swat that survived the initial 
disruption.  They may persist, but in an environment where displacement of people as workers 
and customers presented an additional challenge, alongside disruption to transport and other 
infrastructural business needs and processes.That could happen in any conflict zone, but 
distinctive to this region has been the severe intensification of the existing cultural institutional 
norms around gender and religion, which may now be enforced though violence and 
perpetuated through acts of retribution.  As a result, formal and informal institutions are being 
forced into a process of co-evolution. This of course affects business and community life 
through increasing risk, fear and uncertainty on a day to day basis that casts doubt on the 
viability of a future in the Swat region, as well as severely curtailing the lucrative tourism 
industry. 
 Thus, in this study, through defining an ongoing conflictual domain, the study contributes to 
entrepreneurship in challenging institutional contexts that afford high risk (security and 
business), ongoing uncertainty, and concerns over what is legitimate behaviour – or not.Given 
the exacerbation of existing tensions between formal and informal institutions, and the 
introduction of new tensions, the question arises as to how entrepreneurs are coping with the 
new institutional context.Managed narratives have been used elsewhere (Hardy and Maguire, 
2009), as have different business strategies (Sutter et al., 2013).  For entrepreneurs, Spedale 
and Watson (2014) suggest thatthe habits of learned behaviour need to be reshaped to fit the 
new institutional setting, while Peng (2000) cautions us against rigid categorisations of 
responses.  Smallbone and Welter (2011) note that not all entrepreneurs react the same way, 
suggesting three main groups of factors as important influences on entrepreneurial behaviour: 
contextual, venture and person-related factors.   
 
In summary then, this study addresses the overarching research question, that is, how are firm 
owners orienting their entrepreneurial behaviour to remain legitimate in the conflictual 
institutional landscape that shapes their context? Thus, 16 SMEs are examined, who present 
different responses to the common institutional context of the Swat valley conflict. It will be 
useful to see if there are different responses (Peng, 2000; Smallbone and Welter, 2011) and if 
so, how habitual behaviour is being shaped by the new institutional setting; further, whether 
the responses identified by Hardy and Maguire (2009) and Sutter et al. (2013) are also 
identifiable within the entrepreneurial behaviours studied in the shifting institutional logics of 
this region.  Theoretically, we contribute to knowledge around the relationship between 
entrepreneurship, institutions and legitimacy. Practically, it is useful to know more about 
behaviours that are seen as commonplace in entrepreneurs such as strategy development, 
opportunity recognition, networking, risk management and innovation (Chell, 1985), are 
grounded in this institutional context that sits somewhere between war (which is very difficult 
to research) and economic upheaval.  Recognising, as Welter and Smallbone (2012) point out, 
that these commonplace terms may well be interpreted differently in this regionwill provide 
insight into how such behaviours might be nonetheless harnessed towards success, and what 
support mechanisms should be in place.  
 
Methodology 
This study is qualitative, carried out through semi-structured interviews with the founders of 
16 small firms. At the outset, a local trade association was contacted to obtain information 
about suitable firms, and to connect with the owner-managers of the firms, that is, the 
individuals who manage day-to-day operations and also determine the strategic direction. 
Using this route meant that registered firms were contacted with a relatively high degree of 
formality and therefore visibility (Williams and Shahid, 2014).   
The interviews were taken in August 2012, five years into the actual conflict. All 16 
entrepreneurs were interviewed twice by one of the authors. The longest interview was 
approximately three hours and the shortest one around one and a half hours (in person in the 
Swat valley). All 16 firms were visited, with 15 of the interviews taking place at the firms.  One 
was interviewed at his home, because it was a fasting month and he preferred to do this in the 
evening. Since then, there has been regular informal follow-up contact with 16 entrepreneurs 
who are both still in business in the Swat region.   
The content of the interviews was guided, but not determined by theory and consisted of 
focussed discussions with the respondents.  The participants were asked sequentially about the 
history and antecedents of the business, their own perceptions of how the business was doing, 
their management and business development strategies and the impact that the ongoing conflict 
had had on them and the business.  Topics that had the most relevance to the conflict situation, 
such as changes to opportunity seeking behaviour, networks and perceptions of risk occurred 
throughout the interview and were followed up as they occurred, to maintain the flow of the 
conversation and benefit from the enthusiasm of participants to discuss these areas.  References 
to institutional elements such as the Taliban, the army and the religious climate were also 
followed up, as they occurred.  In this way, it was possible to connect the behaviours at the 
individual/micro level to the institutional macro-level context in which they were embedded.  
The interview schema was therefore a fluid guide that was directive, but not prescriptive, of 
the detail within areas probed by follow-up questions within the interviews.  Although the 
interview as not piloted formally, after each interview, a process of reflection was carried out 
as to whether the overarching strategy of the interview was appropriate, and which follow-up 
questions had been most useful.  This informed the content of the next interview; no changes 
to the overarching strategy were made. The conduct of the interviews was guided by Easterby-
Smith et al. (1991) who suggest the use of exploratory probes, silent probes and mirroring, to 
acquire a clearer vision of the issues that are explored. The exploratory probes that use what, 
why and how questions aim to reveal the reasons why the interviewees hold particular view 
points on issues that are of a high relevance to a study (for example, institutional change). The 
silent probe is a pause that is used during interviews to persuade the respondents to keep on 
following the line of their arguments and providing more information. Mirroring refers to 
repeating back what an interviewee has just said, to elicit confirmation, or follow up 
information.  The above probes were used during the interviews to discover the particular view-
points held by the interviewees on the issues raised by the questions in this study.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive attributes of the businesses.Whether they perceived themselves 
as successful or not, was also recorded.  Given the degree of informality of businesses in 
Pakistan (Williams and Shahid, 2014), these perceptions of success were not tested against a 
quantitative evaluation, as such records would be hard to access, and further insistence could 
potentially damage trust. 
Patton (2002:391) warns that “cultural inquires add layers of complexity to the already-
complex interactions of the interview” Patton suggeststhat researchers should take special care 
when interviews need an interpreter or translator. In this study, the issue was alleviated, as the 
interviewer belongs to the same culture, andis a native Pashto speaker too, in common with the 
interviewees. Thus, all the interviews were conducted in the native language Pashto, recorded, 
and transcribed into English. Questions and themes designed for the in-depth interviews were 
translated from English to Pashto by the interviewer.Special attention was given to transcribing 
the data, because it is a key phase of the data analysis within interpretative qualitative 
methodology (see Bird, 2005).  Transcription is recognized as an interpretative act, where 
meaning is created, rather than simply a mechanical act of putting spoken sounds on paper 
(Lapadat and Lindsay, 1999).After the interviews, the Pashto versions were translated into 
English by listening to the recorded interviews either two or three times, depending on the 
complexity of the language used. An English Language teacher colleague from Jahanzeb 
College in Swat confirmed the translation, by reading the transcript alongside the recording. 
Guidance was also taken from a colleague witha Masters degree in Pashto Language,to provide 
detailed guidance about language-related themes.  
 
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Turning to the analysis, initially, one of the authors, a native speaker, listened to the interviews 
from the digital recordings, familiarizinghimself with the data, taking notes during the 
listening.  Each interview was listened to twice, going back again to sections that were of 
particular interest. After consulting with language experts, all the interview data was 
transcribed into the written English form in order to conduct more detailed qualitative 
analysis.A deductive approach was taken to the analysis, following Miles and Huberman 
(1994).  In this study, the analysis focussed onfive behavioural factors: perception of success, 
strategy development, networking, opportunity seeking, and risk taking.  The categories 
followed the areas that had been the basis of the interview questions; we examined the 
transcripts within the categories for comments and discussion that had specific relevance to the 
conflict situation and any institutional references.  In doing so, it is recognised that the 
questions asked to respondents already have an associated meaning selected for the study 
(Edwards and Lampert, 1993).  While this approach enables focus and a systematic generation 
of new knowledge, this could be considered a limitation, as the focus might shift away from 
the respondents’ suggestions of other emergent categories.  However, great care must be taken 
to avoid forcing data intothese categoriesjust  becausethey had been created at the outset (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  Thus, other categories were considered; one which did emerge from 
the data, is that of weak agency towards institutional change, where the participants were 
trying, through their business activities, to contribute to reshaping depleted institutions, at least 
at local level. 
Findings 
Perception of success: 
The firms in this sample seem to have defied the institutional logics of the conflictual situation, 
and could all be considered successful to some extent.  Their businesses have persisted during 
the conflict, remain in profit, and, in some cases are expanding, even potentially overseas.  In 
many ways, they conform to common patterns of small business.  They scan new opportunities 
to diversify their businesses. They describe themselves as constantly engaging with customers 
to know their tastes and preferences.Nevertheless, some entrepreneurs perceived their firms as 
unsuccessful, even when the firm was in profit, pointing out some major issues that were related 
to the conflictual context. Some of the successful firms had negotiated with the Taliban (not 
all of them said this, though perhaps they did not want to admit to it).  Tellingly, none of the 
firms who described themselves as unsuccessful had negotiated with the Taliban. Being 
‘unsuccessful’ was related to outcomes such as the downsizing of the firm due to security and 
curfew issues impacting on networking and communication channels. One stated that. 
“Frequent curfews have broken our communication with customers and I think is also one of 
the main reasons for struggling” (Entrepreneur 7).  Being unsuccessful was also related to the 
condition of being unable to innovate for growth due to uncertainty.  In 2012, Entrepreneur 16 
stated that, “My first strategy is that I am going to change my firm’s location, because the 
existing location is not safe”.  To date, he has not done that however, continuing to exist in a 
state of uncertainty.One entrepreneur stated, “The most important factor for business success 
is a safe environment, because due to security reasons firms have closed in other parts of the 
region…..when we were displaced from the Swat regions, terrorists attacked our factory and 
we made a huge loss” (Entrepreneur 11).  This entrepreneur had stabilised financially, that but 
did not see that position as feasible in the long term.  While they were surviving without 
collaborative acquiescence, this group perceived their ongoing situation as dangerous; they did 
not co-operate with the Taliban, either because they did not want to or had not seen the need to 
until it was too late.  Overall perceptions of success were related not just to economic norms, 
but to fears around security, which in some cases were related to their status with the Taliban. 
Strategy development:  
Some entrepreneurs have succeeded in financial terms, and, importantly, in their own terms, 
through a proactive strategy where they quickly acquiesced to the aggressors. Further, they 
actually saw opportunity in the conflict: “We have taken the risk to run a business in a conflict 
environment, but our customers have increased because some firms have been closed, which 
decreased the competition level in the region and I think this has had a positive impact on us” 
(Entrepreneur 3). When he was asked about his entrepreneurial capability during the conflict 
environment, he replied “I couldn’t lose my motivation and courage, because I know how to 
handle difficult situations” (Entrepreneur 3). Thus, he concluded that during the conflict period 
they earned profit, gained bigger market share; and made valuable contributions to the local 
community, thus offsetting the potential criticism that overall he was contributing to a negative 
situation.  Entrepreneurs who took this course of action attributed that success to their ability 
to quickly read the situation, and make a strategy based on compromise and negotiation for a 
particular moment in time.  The alternative would have been to close their businesses, which 
was a driver to overcoming any qualms about this course of action.  Of course whether that 
compromise affects business legitimacy in future, remains to be seen.  
 
An alternative strategy seen as successful was to move swiftly in collaborating with firms 
outside the region, which led to an overall improvement in competitive position, for example, 
“we were able to take up an offer from a firm in Lahore who offered to do our production using 
their machines, this helped us to maintain our growth and keep our customers” (Entrepreneur 
2).  This avoidance strategy, though successful in the short term,would mean that fewer jobs 
would be created in the region, 
 
Networking:  
Networking was linked to the ability to deal with the conflictual circumstance, particularly 
through avoidance strategies: “Cooperation with each other can help you to handle difficult 
situations, for example, I would like to say that since the beginning we have had a good 
relationship with other firms, and when the war on terror started and people were displaced 
from their houses, the majority factories were closed and there was no communication, but due 
to our good relationships with other firms, particularly outside the Swat regionwe were able 
to take up an offer from a firm in Lahore who offered to do our production using their machines, 
this helped us to maintain our growth and keep our customers(Entrepreneur 2). 
 
Entrepreneurs who saw themselves as unsuccessful referred to depleted networks: 
“Cooperation amongst firms is very important, particularly in places like Swat Valley where 
the government support is zero. This is the only factor which is very important for us; our 
cooperation was very good three years ago, but due to the conflict situation, we lost our 
communications. Another important issue is that some firms closed their branches, which 
ultimately affected our cooperation”. (Entrepreneur: 15) 
 
Where this occurred, it was difficult to bring innovative products to market: “due to the war on 
terror issue, we lost our communications channels and people do not want to come to our 
region due to security reasons”(Entrepreneur 11). It was difficult to restore the networks: “we 
are currently working in a danger zone and it is not possible to take any steps regarding 
business success”.  because “there are so many military check posts in our region and we are 
scared that any time suicide attacks could happen….those people who live in Peshawar do not 
want to come here, because they think that they are not safe in our region”(Entrepreneur 
10).Trust restoration across the network was also an issue that emerged towards the end of this 
study as conditions stabilise: “The first strategy we are currently trying to achieve is restoring 
the trust of our distributors, because they are thinking that conditions in the region are not 
100% safe and they do not want to come” (Entrepreneur 5). 
 
Opportunity seeking:  
The closure of some firms led to opportunities for some, but not others, and was related to 
strategic action, particularly where a firm perceived themselves as successful:  “We have hired 
a sales team to deliver our products to other markets, because in some areas, particularly in 
upper Swat, there are opportunities, because some firms have been closed due to the conflict 
situation” (Entrepreneur 2).  In these cases, the conflict itself was a source of opportunity, at 
least in the short term, particularly where swift action had been taken to fill a market gap.  In 
contrast, firms who perceived themselves as unsuccessful related the process of scanning for 
opportunities to a safe environment, experiencing a context constrained by the security 
situation arising from the conflict.  For example, one entrepreneur from an unsuccessful firm 
says “Our [opportunity scanning] is related to the law and order situation, for example, 
currently there are opportunities in the market, but the conditions do not allow us to scan 
them”. (Entrepreneur 8). 
 
Risk-taking:  
As stated earlier, entrepreneurship can be a struggle in Pakistan at the best of times, through 
straightforward economic reasons:  “The biggest risk for us is the inflation, because in Pakistan 
the inflation rate is increasing every day and the people have low purchasing power” 
(Entrepreneur 16).  Yet all theparticipants pointed out that operating their businesses in an 
uncertain, conflictual environment was their biggest risk. As one entrepreneur notes, there may 
be increased risk but “I have taken the risk to run a business in a conflict environment, but my 
customers have increased because some firms have been closed, which decreased the 
competition level in the region and I think this has had a positive impact on us”. (Entrepreneur: 
4).  However the situation is still dangerous and as Entrepreneur 2 shows, negotiation can only 
take you so far.  He categorized risk in two ways. The internal risk, for instance fluctuation in 
turnover, unavailability of raw material, he could handle effectively through negotiation: “the 
strategy I used during the conflict, at the time when it was at its worst, was consulting with the 
Taliban, because they were in the areas with raw materials and this strategy gave me benefits”.   
But external risk, in this case, the law and order situation of the Valley, was hard to manage, 
as he recognised, because “it is very risky to work in an uncertain environment, because you 
do not know what will happen tomorrow”. While a co-operative, acquiescent strategy had 
worked successfully thus far, he expressed deep concern about the current problems which still 
present a high risk for his business, through the uncertainty and volatility of the situation 
overall. 
Weak agency 
Outside this study, some individuals in the community have actually got caught up in 
conflictual activities, which caused sadness and disappointment for the participants in this 
study.  As a result, some saw their businesses activities as potentially contributing to 
reconstruction and reshaping of the institutional context, thus demonstrating what was 
characterised as ‘weak agency’. For example: “I personally work with some NGOs to bring 
peace in our region; therefore, I always work with them to organize peace seminars and I think 
it is my biggest contribution” (Entrepreneur 8) and “If we get proper security, I will be able to 
open new branches and will employ those people who used to work with terrorists. I think I 
can make this contribution to peace” (Entrepreneur 14), and “I always support employee 
schemes to help existing employees and hire poor workers and particularly those people who 
used to be involved in terrorist activities”(Entrepreneur 9), while recognising that support 
would be necessary “If we get the necessary support, I will open a branch in upper Swat where 
the terrorists entered”(Entrepreneur 1)and “The main reason of terrorism in our beautiful land 
is the lack of education. If I get the necessary support, my future contribution to peace is to 
give a proper education to my workers and give them the support to open their own 
businesses”(Entrepreneur 5).  Others expressed a deep-seated liking and loyalty towards a 
better future for the region, “In my view, the most important contribution I make to the region 
is that I am from Lahore, but I personally like the Swat region, because the people are very 
nice and I do not want to move my business, because such mobilization will encourage 
terrorists” (Entrepreneur 16).  
Discussion 
Summarising the findings above, in the participants studied, there is much evidence of 
entrepreneurial behaviour that is easily recognisable and driven by economic norms: the need 
to be profitable,the need to spot new opportunities and new markets and to manage economic 
risk.  Indeed, all the participants in the study have persisted through the conflictual stage with 
firms intact and in profit.  Alongside that though, not unexpectedly, as Welter and Smallbone 
(2012) suggest, thosemicro-level behaviours were shaped by the uncertain, insecure, and at 
times coercive institutional context, which frames the decision of where to operate 
geographically, how to leverage networks, what constitutes an opportunity and perceptions of 
risk and personal security.As Peng(2000), Sutter et al. (2013) and Welter and Smallbone, 
(2011) point out, not all entrepreneurs react in the same way to institutional pressures, and this 
has been the case in this study.  It is clear that the participants were influenced by complex 
interactions of many factors, including family history, business background and the 
geographical composition of their networks, as well as their interactions with institutional 
forces.  As Bulloughet al. (2014) argue, resilience and self-belief play an important part in 
entrepreneurial achievement in conflictual contexts. However, perception depends upon the 
entrepreneur’s resources and the surrounding institutional environment, particularly when there 
is coercion or a threat to security for themselves, their business or their families.  Thus, 
economic success for some, was compromised by depleted networks and question marks over 
future growth, and more importantly, safety, which led them to feel unsuccessful overall. 
 
In the main, strategies of avoidance, or acquiescence (negotiation and collaboration) have been 
adopted, rather than defiance (Oliver, 1991; Sutter et al., 2013) to achieve persistence of the 
firm. Those who saw themselves as successful had in some cases secured success by 
negotiation strategies (Hardy and Maguire 2006, 2009) either with the Taliban, or with locals 
in high risk areas, or perhaps both, to secure new markets, achieving a degree of legitimacy 
with those concerned in the locale as they did so.  In some cases, they saw their ability to act 
in an agile manner, leveraging their networks to operate in this way as a measure of their skill 
and entrepreneurial acumen.  Others practised avoidance strategies (Sutter et al., 2013), 
leveraging opportunity from networksoutside the region, thus creating an alternative kind of 
legitimacy, decentred from the conflict zone.As Hardy and Maguire (2006, 2009) suggest, 
managing narratives is important in the negotiation of legitimacy in a conflictual institutional 
climate; this must be handled effectively not only with the aggressors (through collaboration 
or acquiescence strategies), but also with wider business networks and the local community, to 
achieve stability, at least for a time.  Some entrepreneurs enacted weak agency in an attempt to 
reshape the institutional future, working at the micro-level towards peace through their 
businesses employment strategies for example. 
 
The research question for this study was,how are firm owners orienting their entrepreneurial 
behaviour to remain legitimate in the conflictual institutional landscape that shapes their 
context? It is clear that the institutions do present difficulties for the entrepreneurs.  As noted 
by Williams and Shahid (2014) there is limited confidence in formal institutions in Pakistan, 
and entrepreneurs in the country generally have become accustomed to a certain fluidity and 
informality of practice, particularly as distance increases from urban centres, such as in the 
Swat Valley (Nouman, 2011).  Insurgency has compounded this existing difficulty by causing 
a phase of de-institutionalisation/re- institutionalisation, where the programme of a political 
movement founded on powerful religious values has been set in place by force – a process then 
reversed by the intervention of armed forces.  Despite this turbulence, there were those who 
had the capability to organize productive strategy and exploit opportunities (Aguilar, 2004; 
Naude, 2009; Naude and Rossouw, 2010), with conflict itself presenting new 
opportunities.This is perhaps not too surprising.  Pakistan’s journey to a more secular, liberal 
state is questionable at the best of times, as the traditional norms and values of strong religious 
institutions still hold an appeal for some, and an opportunity therefore in Swat for a cultural 
legitimacy, despite the violence which has occurred.  An insurgency of this kind, as Welter 
points out, provides an institutional void that can lead to activities and alliances that might be 
seen by some as undesirable (Baumol, 1990; Welter, 2012).  Yet, in adopting an acquiescent 
strategy (Oliver, 1991; Sutter et al., 2013)through negotiation (Hardy and Maguire, 2006, 
2009) however,entrepreneurs are able to preservetheir family history, their business and 
employment and trade in the Swat region and beyond; assuch, they considerthemselves as 
having done good in the community overall.  The pressure to conform to shifting institutions 
in the face of such embeddedness, and a severe security threat, is very strong.  The question 
then, consideringMehlumet al. (2003) and Baumol (1990), is whether such a strategy might 
only have short term benefits.  At the family business level, once the conflict is over, will 
connections with the Taliban count against them, or will the local community accept that such 
expedience was necessary and indeed desirable if at least some jobs and stability were 
preserved.  In terms of the low development trap, these strategies, if repeated by many SMEs, 
might result in the insurgency lasting longer than it might otherwise, which might have a 
negative impact on the region overall.  Of course, such entrepreneurs may be very skilful at 
reconfiguring their resources swiftly to whatever the future holds, and demonstrate the tenacity 
of entrepreneurship through cyclical variations in institutional conditions(Bulloughet al., 2014; 
Ciarliet al., 2010).  Those who are adept at generating narratives with the Taliban may well be 
skilled at re-working those narratives to fit a new contextlater on(Hardy and Maguire, 2006, 
2009); this would be a useful avenue for future research. A similar research question would 
apply to those who had instead chosen to legitimise their activities outside the conflict zone.  
Another area that might benefit from quantitative research is the motivation behind behavioural 
choice, which results, in this study, from complex interactions of many factors, including 
family history, business background and the geographical composition of their networks. There 
is evidence for weak agency around longer term objectives such as better education and 
prospects for those who become (or may become) involved in violence (Welter and Smallbone, 
2011, 2012).  Longer term research would be needed to establish this point. 
 
From a practical point of view, the study confirms that entrepreneurs react in different ways to 
institutional pressures (Welter and Smallbone, 2011), raising different questions over 
legitimacy, for the present and also for the future, should the institutional climate change.  
Better understanding of the connection between legitimacy and entrepreneurial behaviour may 
aid policymakers and business support organisations in the region.  It has also been shown that 
while strategies of acquiescence, avoidance and negotiation prevail, there is the potential for 
weak agency to reshape institutions, which policymakers and regional governance structures 
should encourage. 
 
Finally then, this study has contributed to the growing body of literature on entrepreneurship 
in conflict environments (Roberts, 2010), which is still a relatively underexplored area 
(Boudreaux, 2007; Brucket al., 2011, 2015; Ciarli, 2010).Through concentrating on embedded 
agency in relation to institutional contexts, the body of literature developed by Hashi, (2011), 
Maguire and Hardy (2006), Sutter et al., (2013),Williams and Shahid, (2014), Williams and 
Vorley, (2014) Welter and Smallbone (2011, 2012)is extended to the conflictual context which 
is neither all-out war, gang dominance, nor economic restructuring. The subtleties of 
establishing legitimacy through different entrepreneurial responses have been demonstrated; 
the theoretical implication is that this is a useful area to pursue further given the dominance of 
studies that have focussed on the macro level thus far (Collier, 2006; Cramer, 2006).  The study 
also contributes to the literature on entrepreneurship in Pakistan (Chemin, 2010; Williams and 
Shahid, 2014; Williams and Vorley, 2014).  The results may also be useful where there is a 
similar institutional climate, Afghanistan for example (Binzel and Tilman, 2007; Bulloughet 
al., 2014; Justino, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this study has provided empirical evidence on what strategies entrepreneurs 
adopted to achieve success and how success can be perceived very differently in conflictual 
contexts. This context is distinctive due to the deeply embedded religious and cultural norms 
that are dominating the institutional climate, formal and informal, at least for now. In taking an 
institutional theory perspective, the study has provided conceptual underpinning for providing 
new knowledge in the rarely-studied zone between all-out war and economicturbulence.  In 
doing so, avenues for further research have been identified.  Of course, these results come from 
a small number entrepreneurs and one particular location in the Swat Valley of KPK province 
of Pakistan, so inevitably that is a limitation on the generalizability of the results.  
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